The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure on Information Acquisition : Theory and Experiment by Miwa, Kazunori
 
 
 
Discussion Papers In Economics 
And Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN
 
The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure on Information 
Acquisition: Theory and Experiment 
 
 
Kazunori Miwa 
 
Discussion Paper 13-01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN 
 
The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure on Information 
Acquisition: Theory and Experiment 
 
 
Kazunori Miwa 
 
Discussion Paper 13-01 
 
The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure on Information
Acquisition: Theory and Experiment
Kazunori Miwa y
Abstract
This study experimentally investigates the interaction between rm's
information acquisition choice and mandatory disclosure in the pres-
ence of proprietary costs. The results demonstrate that mandatory
disclosure diminishes rm's incentive to acquire industry-wide demand
information when information acquisition is costly and endogenous.
Further, I also show that rm's production decision is improved by ac-
quiring information. Taken together, although acquiring information
improves rm's production decision, mandatory disclosure diminishes
rm's incentive to do so, and thus, deteriorates rm's information en-
vironment. This leads to inecient production, which in turn, might
have a substantial impact on market outcomes.
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Proprietary Cost; Experiment
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Regulatory agencies require listed companies to publicly disclose certain in-
formation. While such disclosure is regulated mainly in an attempt to protect
decision makers in the capital market, disclosed information is also used by
competitor rms in the product market. In fact, Graham et al. (2005) survey
more than 400 corporate executives and nd that the competitive disadvan-
tage caused by disclosure, which is often referred to as a proprietary cost, is
one of the main factors that rms are reluctant to voluntarily disclose private
information.
Numerous theoretical studies examine the interaction between disclosure
of information and product market competition, and provide important in-
sights on the proprietary disclosure.1 Darrough (1993) analyzes a two-stage
duopoly model and demonstrates that when rms are engaged in Cournot
competition under demand uncertainty, they would not commit to disclosure
of industry-wide demand information due to the proprietary nature of this
type of information. Suijs and Wielhouwer (2009) extend Darrough's (1993)
model and show that although Cournot duopolists prefer not to disclose
industry-wide demand information ex ante, mandatory disclosure require-
ments can enhance social welfare, which is measured by either consumer
surplus or total surplus, especially in the case where products are perfect
substitutes.
However, it is unclear whether mandating disclosure can achieve the in-
1See, for example, Darrough (1993), Sankar (1995), Clinch and Verrecchia (1997), Arya
and Mittendorf (2007), Suijs and Wielhouwer (2009), and Bagnoli and Watts (2010). See
also Vives (2001, Ch.8), and Christensen and Feltham (2003, Ch.15).
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tended objective of improving social welfare when information acquisition by
rms is endogenous and costly. Firms must often spend resources to obtain
private information, and hence face a trade-o between the costs and benets
of information acquisition. In addition, if acquired information is disclosed,
not only a rm which acquired costly information but also competitor rms
in the product market can strategically use this information and make more
informed decisions. Therefore, it is possible that the benets of acquiring
information relatively decrease when disclosure is mandated. The point is
that mandatory disclosure of proprietary information might diminish rm's
incentive to acquire such information, and in turn, have a substantial impact
on market outcomes.
The objective of this paper is to examine the interaction between rm's
information acquisition choice and mandatory disclosure in the presence of
proprietary costs. More specically, I develop a Cournot duopoly model with
stochastic demand in which acquiring information is endogenous. Further, in
order to test the theoretical predictions I use an experimental economics ap-
proach and conduct a series of experiments. In the experiments, participants
take the role of either the rm or the rival, and the rm chooses whether or
not to acquire costly information about unknown demand parameter.2 I ma-
nipulate information acquisition cost (low or high) in two economic settings
(disclosure is mandated or not). In the mandatory disclosure treatment, if
2While most theoretical studies that analyze a stochastic duopoly/oligopoly model con-
sider two types of information: rm-specic cost information and industry-wide demand
information, the key distinction is between rm-specic versus industry-wide information,
not between cost versus demand information (see, Christensen and Feltham, 2003, Ch.15).
In line with previous research, I interpret industry-wide information as pertaining to de-
mand.
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the rm chooses to acquire information, it receives a perfect signal about the
true demand state and this signal is revealed to the public. That is, both
the rm and the rival can learn the true demand state before making their
production decisions. On the other hand, in the nondisclosure treatment,
if the rm chooses to acquire information, only the rm can learn the true
demand state and the rival remains uncertain about the state. Regardless
of whether disclosure is mandated or not, if the rm chooses not to acquire
information, both rms remain uncertain about demand state.
The main results are as follows. First, rms in the nondisclosure treat-
ment tend to acquire information more frequently than those in the manda-
tory disclosure treatment. Second, rms acquire information more frequently
when information acquisition cost is low. Third, when rms learn the true
demand state through information acquisition or disclosure, they success-
fully adjust production levels depending on the state. Taken together, these
results indicate that when rms compete in quantities, although acquiring
information improves rms' production decisions, mandatory disclosure di-
minishes rms' incentives to do so, and as a result, lead to inecient produc-
tion decisions. In other words, when information acquisition is endogenous
and costly, mandatory disclosure might have an unintended consequence that
rms suer deterioration in their information environments.3
As mentioned above, previous theoretical studies, such as Darrough (1993)
and Suijs and Wielhouwer (2009), examine the interaction between disclo-
3In a dierent perspective, Pae (2000) analytically demonstrates that mandatory dis-
closure in a Cournot market under demand uncertainty might reduce social welfare. Pae
(2000) focuses on the timing of rms' production decisions, not information acquisition
process.
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sure of information and product market competition. Furthermore, several
studies report the results of experiments which are designed to test the theo-
retical predictions (Cason, 1994; Cason and Mason, 1999; Ackert et al., 2000).
However, most of the existing literature takes rm's private information as
exogenous. In other words, the interaction between rm's information acqui-
sition choice and disclosure of information is typically ignored in the previous
research. Conversely, there are several studies that examine information ac-
quisition by rms in oligopolistic market, but the issue of disclosure is ignored
(Li et al., 1987; Hwang, 1995; Hauk and Hurkens, 2001).
Notable exceptions are Kirby (2004) and Jansen (2008). Both papers
simultaneously consider the problem of information acquisition and disclosure
in oligopoly.4 The contribution of this paper is to develop a simplied model
and test the theoretical predictions by conducting controlled experiments.
As pointed out by Ackert et al. (2000), an experimental approach has
several advantages in examining stochastic duopoly models. For example,
researchers are able to create a controlled economic environment which they
wish to examine, and can directly observe rms' behavior. In addition, re-
searchers can compare the results under dierent conditions by manipulating
the parameters of the environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe
the model which provides the basis for experimental tests. In section 3, I
describe the experimental design. Section 4 reports the results and Section
5 concludes this paper.
4In the context of the capital market, Pae (1999) also analyzes the problem of infor-
mation acquisition and disclosure.
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2 Model
Consider a single-period product market where two rms compete in quanti-
ties, i.e., Cournot duopoly market, under demand uncertainty. I distinguish
the two rms: \the rm" and \the rival". Both rms are assumed to be risk-
neutral. The market price, p, is determined by a stochastic linear inverse
demand function:
p = a+    (qf + qr); (1)
where qf (qr) denotes the output of the rm (the rival). I assume that a > 0
is a constant and  is a random variable distributed on a closed interval
[; ] with E() = 0 and V ar() = 2. In order to avoid yielding negative
quantities in equilibrium, I also assume that a +  > 0. For simplicity, the
marginal cost of production is assumed to be zero for both rms. Hence, the
prot of each rm is simply given by:
i = fa+    (qf + qr)gqi; i = r; f: (2)
The sequence of events is as follows. In the rst stage, a regulatory agency
decides whether or not to mandate disclosure of information about market
demand. However, the regulatory agency is not explicitly modeled as an eco-
nomic agent. That is, I take the disclosure regulation as exogenous. In stage
2, the rm chooses whether to acquire information at cost k, or not to acquire
information. If the rm acquires information, a perfect signal about the true
demand state is revealed to it. That is, the rm can observe the realized
5
value of . On the other hand, if the rm chooses not to acquire information,
the rm remains uncertain about demand state. The information acquisition
cost k > 0 is assumed to be a constant.5 In stage 3,  is realized and the
rm receives a signal or not in accordance with its information acquisition
choice. Furthermore, when disclosure is mandated, the signal that the rm
acquired is also revealed to the rival. That is, if the rm chose to acquire
information in stage 2, the rival can also observe the realized value of . I
assume that disclosure is truthful. In the nal stage, both the rm and the
rival simultaneously choose their output levels, qf and qr, respectively.
There are four possible cases: (i) the rm acquires information under
nondisclosure, (ii) the rm acquires information under mandatory disclosure,
(iii) the rm does not acquire information under nondisclosure, and (iv) the
rm does not acquire information under mandatory disclosure. Note that
the rm is assumed not to voluntarily disclose the acquired signal when
disclosure is not mandated, because the rm dose not have an incentive to
do so (Darrough, 1993). Furthermore, even if disclosure is mandated, the rm
is allowed to acquire no information. In this case, the disclosed message does
not have information content at all. This assumption seems to be reasonable
because forward-looking information is under consideration in this model.
The game structure stated above is common knowledge. In the analysis, I
only consider the case where each rm chooses its pure strategy and solve
the game backward.
5To simplify the experimental task, only one rm makes the decision about information
acquisition. In addition, I limit the set of information acquisition alternatives: acquiring
a perfect signal at a constant cost or not acquiring any signals.
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2.1 Equilibrium Strategies
First, consider the case (i): the rm acquires information under nondisclo-
sure. In this case, the rm can condition its output choice on the signal
value, but the rival cannot. Thus, the rm and the rival maximize their own
expected prot in (3) and (4), respectively:6
max
qf ()
E(f j) = E(fa+    (qf () + qr)gqf ()j); (3)
max
qr
E(r) = E(fa+    (qf () + qr)gqr): (4)
Each rm's optimal output level is yielded by jointly solving the rst-order
condition for (3) and (4). Using this solution and taking expectation over 
yields the ex ante expected prot of each rm. Recall that the rm incurs
information acquisition cost k. These results are summarized in the following
lemma, where the superscript, AN , represents the case in which the rm
acquires information under nondisclosure.
Lemma 1. In the case where the rm acquires information under nondis-
closure, the optimal output and the ex ante expected prot of each rm are
as follows:
qANf =
1
3
a+
1
2
 qANr =
1
3
a (5)
E(ANf ) =
1
9
a2 +
1
4
2   k E(ANr ) =
1
9
a2: (6)
Next, consider the case (ii): the rm acquires information under manda-
6Note that information acquisition cost is sunk at this stage.
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tory disclosure. In this case, both rms can condition their output choices
on the signal value. Therefore, the objective function of each rm is given
by:
max
qi()
E(ij) = E(fa+    (qf () + qr())gqi()j); i = f; r: (7)
By solving the two rst-conditions for (7), both rms' optimal output levels
and the ex ante expected prots are yielded as following lemma, where the
superscript, AD, represents the case in which the rm acquires information
under mandatory disclosure.
Lemma 2. In the case where the rm acquires information under mandatory
disclosure, the optimal output and the ex ante expected prot of each rm are
as follows:
qADf =
1
3
a+
1
3
 qADr =
1
3
a+
1
3
 (8)
E(ADf ) =
1
9
a2 +
1
9
2   k E(ADr ) =
1
9
a2 +
1
9
2: (9)
Finally, consider the cases (iii) and (iv). These two cases are the same
in the sense that the rm acquires no information, and hence, both rms
remain uncertain about demand when they make production decisions. In
other words, disclosure regulation does not aect rms' output choices. The
objective function of each rm is as follows:
max
qi
E(i) = E(fa+    (qf + qr)gqi); i = f; r: (10)
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By solving (10), each rm's optimal output level and the ex ante expected
prot are yielded as following lemma, where the superscript, , represents
the case in which the rm acquires no information. Note that the rm does
not incur information acquisition cost.
Lemma 3. In the case where the rm acquires no information, the optimal
output and the ex ante expected prot of each rm are as follows:
qf =
1
3
a qr =
1
3
a (11)
E(f ) =
1
9
a2 E(r ) =
1
9
a2: (12)
The comparison among equations (5), (8), and (11) indicates that the
rm adjusts its output level conditional on the signal value if it acquires in-
formation. This means that the acquired information is useful for production
decision. However, the comparison between equations (6) and (9) suggests
that the benets of acquiring information relatively decrease when disclosure
is mandated. This is because when acquired information is disclosed, the
rival can also use the information and adjust its output as seen in equation
(8).
Based on the above analysis, I investigate the information acquisition
choice by the rm. The comparison among the expected prot of the rm
gives the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The information acquisition choice by the rm is as follows:
1. If k  1
9
2, then the rm acquires information regardless of whether
disclosure is mandated or not.
9
2. If 1
9
2 < k < 1
4
2, then the rm acquires information under nondisclo-
sure, but not under mandatory disclosure.
3. If 1
4
2  k, then the rm does not acquire information regardless of
whether disclosure is mandated or not.
Proposition 1 shows that mandatory disclosure narrows the set of pa-
rameters that the rm chooses to acquire information. This means that the
rm's incentive to acquire information is diminished when disclosure is man-
dated. The proposition also suggests that given the magnitude of demand
uncertainty, 2, the rm acquires more information when the information ac-
quisition cost is low. Additionally, given the information acquisition cost, k,
the rm acquires more information when the uncertainty of market demand
increases.
2.2 Welfare Analysis
This subsection investigates the desirability of disclosure regulation. For this
purpose, I consider consumer surplus and total surplus as measures of social
welfare. In my model, the expected consumer surplus is given by:
E(CS) =
1
2
E(Q2); (13)
where Q = qf + qr. The expected total surplus is then dened as E(TS) =
E(f ) + E(r) + E(CS). The expected consumer surplus and the expected
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total surplus are calculated as follows:
E(CSAN) =
2
9
a2 +
1
8
2 E(TSAN) =
4
9
a2 +
3
8
2   k (14)
E(CSAD) =
2
9
a2 +
2
9
2 E(TSAD) =
4
9
a2 +
4
9
2   k (15)
E(CS) =
2
9
a2 E(TS) =
4
9
a2; (16)
where the superscripts represent each case in previous subsection. The com-
parison of equations (14), (15), and (16) with proposition 1 obtains the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that disclosure of industry-wide demand informa-
tion is mandated.
1. If k  1
9
2, then social welfare is enhanced.
2. If 1
9
2 < k < 1
4
2, then social welfare is reduced.
3. If 1
4
2  k, then there is no change in social welfare.
The rm's information acquisition choice creates the dierence in eco-
nomic consequences of mandatory disclosure. Given the magnitude of de-
mand uncertainty, if information acquisition cost is suciently low, the rm
acquires information about demand regardless of disclosure regulation. In
this case, both the rm and the rival can successfully adjust their output
levels under mandatory disclosure, and this leads to the improvement of so-
cial welfare. However, when the cost increases and reaches a certain level,
the rm acquires information only if disclosure is not mandated. Thus, in
making production decisions, both rms remain uncertain about demand
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state under mandatory disclosure while at least the rm can adjust its out-
put conditional on the acquired signal under nondisclosure. In other words,
mandatory disclosure deteriorates the rm's information environment, and
eventually total surplus is decreased. Finally, if information acquisition cost
is above a certain level, the rm does not acquire information regardless of
disclosure regulation. Therefore, mandatory disclosure regulation does not
aect production activities and social welfare.
3 Experimental Design
Based on the model analyzed in the previous section, I conduct a series of
experiments on Cournot duopoly market with stochastic demand. In the
experiments, participants take the role of either the rm or the rival, and the
rm chooses whether or not to acquire costly information about unknown
demand parameter. I manipulate information acquisition cost (low or high)
in two economic settings (disclosure is mandated or not).7 The experimental
design is summarized in Figure 1.
A total of four sessions (i.e., one session for each treatment) with 98
dierent participants were conducted. All sessions were held at Osaka Uni-
versity in January 2012. The experiment was programmed and conducted
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were recruited
from undergraduate and master students from various departments.
Upon arrival at the lab, participants drew lots and were assigned the role
7Because it seems to be obvious that the rm does not acquire information if acquiring
information is too expensive, I am not concerned with such case. That is, in the experi-
ments I focus on the two cases, k  192 and 192 < k < 142, and refer to the former as
\low cost" and the latter as \high cost", respectively.
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Figure 1: Experimental design (Number of subjects in parentheses.)
either the rm or the rival. The assigned role was unchanged throughout
the session. Then, they were assigned a computer screen and received a
set of written instructions that was read aloud by the experimenter. The
instructions used an economic frame (Huck, 2004). The sessions consisted of
22 rounds. At the beginning of each round, rm/rival pairs were randomly
assigned. I used the random matching protocol in order to minimize potential
repeated game eects (e.g., reputation) because the experiments are based
on one shot model.
The steps of each round are as follows. First, the rm chooses whether or
not to acquire costly information about the demand state. There are three
possible states: Good, Medium, and Bad.8 Next, the true demand state
appears on the rm's computer screen or not in accordance with its own
information acquisition choice. Further, in mandatory disclosure treatments
(MD-LC and MD-HC) the true demand state also appears on the rival's com-
puter screen only if the rm chose to acquire information. On the other hand,
the rival cannot observe the state regardless of the rm's choice in nondis-
8In experimental instructions, I used terms \state 1", \state 2", and \state 3" to refer
to Good, Medium, and Bad, respectively.
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closure treatments (ND-LC or ND-HC). Finally, both rms simultaneously
select their own output levels and earn the prots, respectively.
The sessions lasted about 2 hours including instruction time. After the
instructions were read, I conducted one trial round and then started the rst
round. At the end of the session, participants were paid according to their
total prots earned throughout 22 rounds. The average payo was 3,825
Japanese Yen across all treatments.
Recall that the inverse demand function is given by:
p = a+    (qf + qr):
In the experiment, I used the following parameters: a = 180,  2 f 60; 0; 60g.
That is, the demand state Good means  = 60, and in the same way, Medium
is  = 0 and Bad is  =  60, respectively. Further, in the low cost treat-
ments (MD-LC and ND-LC) information acquisition cost k equals 100 while
in the high cost treatments (MD-HC and ND-HC) it equals 500. For sim-
plicity, participants choose their outputs among 25 and 95 at intervals of 5,
i.e., f25; 30; 35; : : : ; 85; 90; 95g. In order to calculate prots, three types of
payo tables, which correspond to each demand state, are provided to par-
ticipants. The theoretical predictions, which provide benchmarks for testing
the experimental results, are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1: Theoretical predictions
Treatment Information Demand The rm's The rival's
acquisition? state output output
MD-LC Yes
Good 80 80
Medium 60 60
Bad 40 40
ND-LC Yes
Good 90 60
Medium 60 60
Bad 30 60
MD-HC No
Good 60 60
Medium 60 60
Bad 60 60
ND-HC Yes
Good 90 60
Medium 60 60
Bad 30 60
Note:
Demand state: Good ( = 60), Medium ( = 0), Bad ( =  60).
Information acquisition cost: Low (k = 100), High (k = 500).
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Table 2: Proportion of information acquisition
Treatment
MD-LC ND-LC MD-HC ND-HC
64.3% 89.4% 47.1% 54.5%
(100%) (100%) (0%) (100%)
Note: Theoretical prediction in parentheses.
4 Results
4.1 Information Acquisition Choices
In this subsection, I examine the rm's information acquisition choice. Table
2 presents the proportion of information acquisition by the rm. The data
shows that the proportion of information acquisition in the treatments MD-
LC and ND-HC is less than the theoretical predictions, and in MD-HC the
proportion is more than the prediction. As pointed out by Ackert et al.
(2000), experimental results typically deviate from point predictions provided
by a theory, because the theory relies on simplifying assumptions. Thus, I
consider whether observed dierences are in the expected direction rather
than the point predictions.
First, I investigate the impact of mandatory disclosure on the rm's in-
formation acquisition choice. I compare the proportion of information ac-
quisition between mandatory disclosure treatments and nondisclosure treat-
ments. The proportion of acquiring information in ND-LC is greater than
that in MD-LC. The dierence is statistically signicant at a conventional
level (p < 0:001, Fisher's exact test). In addition, the data exhibits that
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the proportion in ND-HC is slightly greater than that in MD-HC, and the
dierence is marginally signicant (p = 0:097, Fisher's exact test).
Next, I report the results for the eect of information acquisition cost.
I compare the proportion of information acquisition between low cost treat-
ments and high cost treatments. The proportion in MD-LC is greater than
that in MD-HC. Also, the proportion in ND-LC is greater than that in ND-
LC. Both dierences are statistically signicant (p < 0:001, Fisher's exact
test).
In sum, the results suggest that mandatory disclosure diminishes rm's
incentive to acquire information. Further, increase in cost also aects rm's
information acquisition choice negatively. These ndings are consistent with
the directional, theoretical predictions.
4.2 Production Decisions
4.2.1 The Eects of Information Acquisition
The model predicts that if the rm acquires information and learns the real-
ized demand state before making its production decision, it can successfully
adjust its output level depending on the state. To examine this prediction, I
conduct Kruskal-Wallis tests and Schee's multiple comparison tests for out-
put choices by the rms that acquired information. As the purpose of this
subsection is concerned, I restrict the analysis to the rm's behavior. In all
treatments the Kruskal-Wallis and multiple comparison results indicate that
the dierences among the outputs in each demand state (Good, Medium, or
Bad) is statistically signicant (p < 0:001 for every combination of two de-
17
Table 3: Output levels of informed rms
Treatment
Demand state MD-LC ND-LC MD-HC ND-HC
Good
Mean 82.9 90.3 81.9 86.7
(SD) (7.99) (5.95) (8.75) (7.24)
Median 80 95 80 85
Nash prediction 80 90 80 90
Medium
Mean 62.0 60.1 61.5 60.7
(SD) (7.97) (7.55) (9.82) (8.71)
Median 60 60 60 60
Nash prediction 60 60 60 60
Bad
Mean 39.7 33.6 39.9 30.3
(SD) (4.10) (8.16) (4.48) (6.73)
Median 40 30 40 30
Nash prediction 40 30 40 30
Note: SD means standard deviation.
mand states). These suggest that the informed rm chooses dierent output
level depending on the acquired signal.
In addition, I conduct Kruskal-Wallis tests for output choices by the rms
that did not acquire information. As expected, in all treatments the null
hypotheses that there is no dierences among the outputs in each demand
state is not rejected (p = 0:558 in MD-LC, p = 0:556 in ND-LC, p = 0:636
in MD-HC, and p = 0:347 in ND-HC). That is, the uninformed rm cannot
adjust its output level conditional on the demand state. Taken together,
these results demonstrate that the rm's production decision is improved by
acquiring information.
Table 3 shows mean and median outputs of the informed rms. The
data indicates that the informed rm increases output when demand state
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is Good while it decreases output when demand state is Bad. Furthermore,
the output level of the informed rm is well-predicted by the noncooperative
Nash equilibrium. These ndings support the theoretical predictions.
4.2.2 The eects of Mandatory Disclosure
Next, I consider the following issue: given that the rm acquired information,
how does mandatory disclosure aect the rm's production decision? Table
3 shows that the informed rm increases output when demand state is Good
while it decreases output when demand state is Bad. However, the data also
suggests that the informed rms in the nondisclosure treatments (ND-LC
and ND-HC) increase or decrease their output levels greater than those in
the mandatory disclosure treatments (MD-LC and MD-HC).
First, I make a comparison between MD-LC and ND-LC. When the de-
mand state is Good, the informed rm produces 82.9 units on average in the
treatment MD-LC, which is less than 90.3 units in the treatment ND-LC.
The dierence is statistically signicant at a conventional level (p < 0:001,
Mann-Whitney test). On the other hand, when the demand state is Bad, the
informed rm in MD-LC produces 39.7 units on average, which is more than
33.6 units in ND-LC. The dierence is also signicant (p < 0:001, Mann-
Whitney test).
Next, I compare MD-HC to ND-HC. The dierence of outputs between
the two treatments is signicant when the state is Bad, but it is not signicant
at a conventional level when the state is Good (the state Good: p = 0:013,
the state Bad: p < 0:001, Mann-Whitney test).
These results suggest that when demand state is Good, the informed rms
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Table 4: Output levels of informed rivals
Treatment
Demand state MD-LC MD-HC
Good
Mean 79.2 80.9
(SD) (10.82) (10.32)
Median 80 80
Nash prediction 80 80
Medium
Mean 63.4 59.9
(SD) (8.78) (7.88)
Median 60 60
Nash prediction 60 60
Bad
Mean 41.5 41.1
(SD) (7.15) (7.77)
Median 40 40
Nash prediction 40 40
Note: ND-LC and ND-HC are omitted because the rival always
remains uncertain about demand state.
in the mandatory disclosure treatments tend to produce less than those in
the nondisclosure treatments on average. In contrast, when demand state
is Bad, the informed rms in the mandatory disclosure treatments tend to
produce more than those in nondisclosure treatments on average. This occurs
because, given that the rm acquired information, the rival can also learn the
true demand state and adjust its output under mandatory disclosure. That
is, disclosure of demand information induces the rival to respond in the same
direction, and this makes the rm's response to the acquired information
relatively small as compared to a nondisclosure case (Darrough, 1993). The
informed rivals' output levels are summarized in Table 4.
I conduct Kruskal-Wallis tests and Schee's multiple comparison tests for
output choice by the informed rival. In both treatments the Kruskal-Wallis
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and multiple comparison results indicate that the dierence among the out-
puts in each demand state (Good, Medium, or Bad) is statistically signicant
(p < 0:001 for every combination of two demand states). These suggest that
the informed rival adjusts its output level depending on the demand state
as well as the informed rm does. The point is that the improvement of the
rival's decision brings competitive disadvantages to the rm because both
rms compete in the same market. This means that the benets of acquiring
information relatively decrease under mandatory disclosure.
5 Conclusion
The experimental results are largely consistent with theoretical predictions
about information acquisition choices and production decisions. The results
demonstrate that mandatory disclosure diminishes rm's incentive to acquire
industry-wide demand information when information acquisition is costly and
endogenous. Further, I also show that rm's production decision is improved
by acquiring information. Taken together, although acquiring information
improves rm's production decision, mandatory disclosure diminishes rm's
incentive to do so, and thus, deteriorates rm's information environment.
This leads to inecient production, which in turn, might have a substantial
impact on market outcomes.
However, although this paper nds consistent evidence of the relation be-
tween information acquisition and production decision, this paper cannot nd
experimental evidence consistent with theory with regard to social welfare
(see Appendix, Table 6 and 7). This may be because outputs of both rms
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tend to be greater than theoretical predictions when they are uninformed
of demand state (see Appendix, Table 5). One possible reason is that the
production cost is assumed to be zero in order to simplify the experiments,
but this may lead participants to feel that losses due to overproduction are
relatively small. Therefore, future research can modify the design and repli-
cate the experiments. In addition, this paper uses random matching protocol
in an attempt to test the static model. In reality, however, repeated interac-
tions among the same players may be more appropriate. Further, repeated
interactions can create an opportunity of tacit collusion, and thus, the results
might be dierent from a static setting.
Appendix
A.1 Output Levels of Uninformed Firms and Rivals
Table 5: Mean Output levels of uninformed rms and rivals
Treatment
MD-LC ND-LC MD-HC ND-HC
The rm Mean 76:2 81:6 72:0 71:2
(SD) (14.39) (9.55) (15.46) (11.31)
The rival Mean 62.2 66:4 62.7 65:4
(SD) (17.64) (12.53) (14.40) (12.82)
Note: , and  represent the dierence with Nash prediction, 60,
is signicant at the 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Surplus in low cost treatments
Treatment Prots
Consumer Total
The rm The rival surplus surplus
MD-LC
Mean 3604.6 3630.8 8136.6 15372.1
(SD) (2066.7) (1875.38) (4286.79) (7747.22)
ND-LC
Mean 3575.4 3323.9 8480.0 15379.3
(SD) (2886.60) (1747.00) (3412.65) (7390.76)
Table 7: Surplus in high cost treatments
Treatment Prots
Consumer Total
The rm The rival surplus surplus
MD-HC
Mean 3726.8 3215.0 8607.6 15549.4
(SD) (3076.51) (2629.59) (2469.48) (6403.63)
ND-HC
Mean 3211.5 3523.6 8140.1 14875.2
(SD) (2729.11) (1750.82) (3478.62) (7295.11)
A.2 Prots, Consumer, and Total Surplus
Table 6 presents the both rms' prots, consumer surplus, and total surplus
in the low cost treatments given the optimal information acquisition decisions
(i.e., acquisition for both MD-LC and ND-LC). The theoretical predictions
are as follows. The rm's prot: MD-LC < ND-LC, the rival's prot: MD-
LC > ND-LC, consumer surplus: MD-LC > ND-LC, total surplus: MD-LC
> ND-LC.
Table 7 presents the both rms' prots, consumer surplus, and total sur-
plus in the high cost treatments given the optimal information acquisition
decisions (i.e., no-acquisition for MD-HC and acquisition for ND-HC). The
theoretical predictions are as follows. The rm's prot: MD-HC < ND-HC,
the rival's prot: MD-HC = ND-HC, consumer surplus: MD-HC < ND-HC,
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total surplus: MD-HC < ND-HC.
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